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ABSTRACT
With the convergence of Internet and telephony, new ap-
plications (e.g., WhatsApp) have emerged as an important
means of communication for billions of users. These ap-
plications are becoming an attractive medium for attackers
to deliver spam and carry out more targeted attacks. Since
such applications rely on phone numbers, we explore the fea-
sibility, automation, and scalability of phishing attacks that
can be carried out by abusing a phone number. We demon-
strate a novel system that takes a potential victim’s phone
number as an input, leverages information from applications
like Truecaller and Facebook about the victim and his / her
social network, checks the presence of phone number’s owner
(victim) on the attack channels (over-the-top or OTT mes-
saging applications, voice, e-mail, or SMS), and finally tar-
gets the victim on the chosen channel. As a proof of concept,
we enumerate through a random pool of 1.16 million phone
numbers. By using information provided by popular applica-
tions, we show that social and spear phishing attacks can be
launched against 51,409 and 180,000 users respectively. Fur-
thermore, voice phishing or vishing attacks can be launched
against 722,696 users. We also found 91,487 highly attrac-
tive targets who can be attacked by crafting whaling attacks.
We show the effectiveness of one of these attacks, phishing,
by conducting an online roleplay user study. We found that
social (69.2%) and spear (54.3%) phishing attacks are more
successful than non-targeted phishing attacks (35.5%) on
OTT messaging applications. Although similar results were
found for other mediums like e-mail, we demonstrate that
due to the significantly increased user engagement via new
communication applications and the ease with which phone
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numbers allow collection of information necessary for these
attacks, there is a clear need for better protection of OTT
messaging applications. We propose some recommendations
in this direction.
Keywords
Phone number, Over-The-Top, Phishing, Roleplay, Face-
book, Truecaller, WhatsApp, Vishing.
1. INTRODUCTION
We are being constantly targeted by cyber criminals who
rely on a variety of online attacks to victimize users and
enterprises. Phishing, which is a form of social engineering
attacks, is often used by such criminals to fraudulently gain
access to sensitive information or systems by impersonating
a trusted party [35]. In the past, phishing attacks have used
the e-mail and web channels to reach their victims. How-
ever, recently, there has been a tremendous growth of similar
phishing attempts over the telephony channel. New forms
of phishing attacks have emerged exploiting traditional text
messaging services, i.e., SMS (smishing [11]) and voice phish-
ing (vishing [14]).
Several factors make the telephony channel attractive for
cyber criminals. The convergence of telephony with the In-
ternet has resulted in an unprecedented growth of new forms
of online communication, especially mobile communication
due to the advent of Over-The-Top (OTT) messaging appli-
cations (like WhatsApp, Viber, and WeChat [6]). Because
of the growing popularity of OTT messaging applications,
particularly WhatsApp, malicious actors are now abusing it
for illicit activities like delivering spam and phishing mes-
sages. Unsolicited messages like investment advertisements,
adult conversation ads (random contacts requests) were seen
to propagate on the channel in early 2015 [7].
Vishing attacks are also increasing due to 1) low mobile-
mobile calling plans with the advent of services like Skype
and Google Voice. This allows spammers to pump out huge
volumes of voice calls at a marginal cost, and 2) easy caller
ID spoofing due to Voice over IP phone technology that al-
lows spammers to pick an area code and even the prefix
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number they want when they set up a new phone number.
These numbers can be used to disguise where calls origi-
nate. To avoid falling victim to such vishing attacks and
know more about the incoming phone number, cloud-based
caller identification services are emerging to help in getting
additional information about the caller. Millions of people
are using such applications, namely Truecaller [12], Face-
book’s Hello [4], and Whitepages Caller ID applications and
Block [17].
OTT messaging applications and caller ID applications
use a phone (mobile) number, a personally identifiable piece
of information with which an individual can be associated
uniquely, in most cases [50]. OTT messaging applications
use it to uniquely identify users and allow them to find their
friends who also use the same application and caller ID ap-
plications provide additional information about the calling
phone number. Prior research has shown that other Inter-
net resources like e-mail addresses can be exploited as an
identifier to launch targeted phishing attacks [35, 47], dis-
tributed phishing attacks [37], and to correlate user identi-
ties across social networking platforms [21]. In this paper
we demonstrate how attackers can exploit phone number
as a unique identifier and use cross-application features for
launching spear [47] and social phishing attacks [35].
A challenge spammers face when using an e-mail address
is that this medium is heavily defended and spammers of-
ten cannot ensure that a spam message has been delivered
and seen by the target user. Furthermore, unlike e-mail
addresses that come from an unlimited pool and can be
freely created, phone numbers are a limited and controlled
resource. People generally retain the same number for a
long period due to the cost associated with it [10]. Also,
phone numbers are a finite pool with a defined numbering
plan. They can be easily enumerated by looping through
the entire pool of number space. However, it is possible
that not all phone numbers are currently allocated to users
and some of them may be unassigned. Thus, determining if
a phone number is currently assigned and its owner can be
reached is a challenge that needs to be overcome before such
applications can be targeted.
In this paper, we demonstrate how a phone number can be
used across multiple applications to aggregate private and
personal information about the owner of the phone number.
Such information can then be used for targeted attacks. For
example, reverse-lookup contact feature used by caller ID
applications like Truecaller [12] can be exploited to find more
details (name) about the phone number’s owner. Moreover,
by correlating this with the public information present on
online social networking platforms (e.g., Facebook), attack-
ers can determine the social circle (friends) of the victim.
Such information can then be used to launch a variety of
phishing attacks.
We focus on exploring how cross-application features can
be exploited to harvest information that can facilitate tar-
geted and non-targeted attacks on different channels viz.,
OTT messaging applications, voice, e-mail, or SMS. First,
we demonstrate how to craft targeted spear and social phish-
ing attacks against a random pool of phone numbers on OTT
messaging applications. OTT messaging applications allow
attackers to find relevant information about targets by ex-
ploiting address book syncing feature which helps to discover
friends on a given OTT messaging application (e.g., What-
sApp). Second, we demonstrate a novel targeted vishing at-
tack that can be carried out by compromising the integrity
of caller ID applications; an attacker can create a convincing
profile to gain victim’s trust. Also, because the information
(e.g. name) provided to these applications during registra-
tion is not verified fully, it is relatively easy to add accounts
with false information and impersonate trusted entities such
as banks. By making a call appear to come from such enti-
ties, it is easy to deceive people into giving out their personal
information like bank account number, credit card number
etc. The success rate of vishing attacks can be increased by
making them more personalized and targeted by collecting
information about the victim from Truecaller and Facebook.
Third, we provide early evidence of the feasibility of craft-
ing whaling attacks [15], attacks that are targeted against
the owners of vanity numbers [9], phone numbers generally
owned by people with high influence or high-net-worth indi-
viduals, who are very attractive targets for criminals.
By developing an automated and scalable system that al-
lows such attacks to be crafted at scale and evaluating the
effectiveness of phishing attacks on OTT messaging applica-
tions (as a proof of concept) with a roleplay user study, we
make the following contributions on three different fronts:
• Feasibility: This is the first attempt to systemati-
cally understand the threat posed by the ease of cor-
relating user information across caller ID lookup ap-
plication (Truecaller), and social networking applica-
tion (Facebook). This was executed using phone num-
bers as unique identifiers. We show the attack is feasi-
ble with easily available computational resources, and
poses a significant security and privacy threat. An at-
tacker can use these cross-application features to launch
highly targeted attacks on multiple channels like OTT
messaging applications, voice, e-mail, or SMS.
• Automation: We design and implement an auto-
mated system that takes a phone number as an input,
collects necessary information about the victim (owner
of the phone number). It can automatically determine
the target attack channel (OTT messaging applica-
tions, voice, e-mail, or SMS), and finally crafts an at-
tack vector (both targeted and non-targeted) to launch
an attack against the victim on the chosen channel.
• Scalability: For 1,162,696 random pool of Indian phone
numbers that we enumerated, it is possible to launch
social and spear phishing attacks against 51,409 and
180,000 users respectively. Vishing attacks can be launched
against 722,696 users. We also found 91,487 highly in-
fluential victims who can be attacked by crafting whal-
ing attacks against them.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of phishing attacks on
OTT messaging applications, we present results by conduct-
ing a roleplay user study with 314 participants recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Our results are
consistent with prior research on e-mail and online social
networks [21, 35] and confirm empirically that social phish-
ing (69.2%) is the most successful attack on OTT messaging
applications, as compared to spear (54.3%) and non-targeted
phishing (35.5%) attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first exploration
of large-scale targeted attacks abusing phone numbers along
with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the attacks. Given
that telephony medium is not as well defended as e-mail, we
believe that these contributions offer a promising new direc-
tion and demonstrate the urgent need for better security for
such applications.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly outline some of the prior re-
search related to abusing phone numbers; vishing attacks
and Spam over Internet Telephony (see Section 2.1) and
abusing address book syncing feature of smartphones for
user profiling (see Section 2.2), We also discuss some of the
related work on launching targeted attacks on online social
media (see Section 2.3).
2.1 Vishing Attacks and SPIT
Due to low cost and scalability of VoIP based calling sys-
tems, scammers are using the telephony channel to make
millions of call and expand the vishing ecosystem. Prior
work has explored the detection and ways to combat scams
on VoIP. Griffin et al. demonstrated that vishing attacks
can be carried out using VoIP [30]. They illustrated how
several vishing attacks can be crafted in order to increase
information security awareness. Chiappetta et al. ana-
lyzed VoIP CDRs (Call Detail Records) to build features
that can classify normal or malicious users during voice com-
munication [26]. The features were built using mutual in-
teractions and communication patterns between the users.
Past literature demonstrates detection of spam over VoIP
through semi-supervised clustering [49], constructing multi-
stage spam filter based on trust and reputation of callers [27],
comparing human communication patterns with hidden Tur-
ing tests to detect botnets [44], building a system using fea-
tures like call duration, social networks, and global reputa-
tion [19], proposing protection model based on user-profile
framework such as users’ habits [45], placing telephone hon-
eypots to collect intelligence about telephony attacks [31,
33], and using call duration and traffic rate [39]. Caller ID
spoofing is being used by scammers to hide their real identity
and make fraudulent calls. Researchers have implemented
various solutions to detect caller ID spoofing, using covert
channels built on timing estimation and call status for veri-
fication [43], identifying the caller by tracing the calls to the
corresponding SIP-ISUP interworking gateway [48], using
customer’s phonebook feature for storing white and black
lists for filtering unwanted voice calls [24], and detecting au-
dio codecs in call path, calculating packet loss and noise
profiles to determine source and path of the call [20].
In this work, we present first evidence of feasibility of tar-
geted vishing attacks by exploiting the integrity of the infor-
mation provided by caller ID applications e.g., Truecaller.
2.2 Abusing Address Book Syncing in OTT Mes-
saging Applications
Recent work shows that collection of user profiles can
be automated and yields a lot of personal information like
phone numbers, display names, and profile pictures [25, 38].
Schrittwieser et al. analyzed popular OTT messaging ap-
plications like WhatsApp, Viber, Tango etc. and evalu-
ated their security models with a focus on authentication
mechanisms [46]. They also highlighted the enumeration
and privacy-related attacks that are possible due to address
book syncing feature of these applications. Antonatos et al.
proposed HoneyBuddy, an active honeypot infrastructure
designed to detect malicious activities in Instant Messaging
applications like MSN [18]. It automatically finds people
using a particular messaging service and adds them to its
contacts. These findings confirmed the ineffectiveness of ex-
isting security measures in Instant Messaging services.
In our research, we further demonstrate how cross-application
features can be abused to launch targeted attacks; address
book sync feature in OTT messaging applications and ex-
ploiting integrity of information in caller ID applications.
2.3 Targeted Attacks and User Profiling
Bilge et al. launched automated identity theft attacks
via profiling users on SNS (Social Networking Services) by
employing friend relationship with the victims [22]. The au-
thors showed that people tend to accept friend requests from
strangers on social networks. Balduzzi et al. presented ex-
periments conducted on“social phishing” [21]. They crawled
social networking sites to obtain publicly available informa-
tion about users and manually crafted phishing e-mails con-
taining certain information about them. This study showed
that victims are more likely to fall for phishing attempts if
some information about their friends or about themselves
is included in the phishing e-mail. Jagatic et al. showed
that Internet users might be over four times more likely
to become victims if the sender is an acquaintance [35].
Gupta et al. showed that inference attacks can be em-
ployed to harvest real interests of people and subsequently
break mechanisms that use such personal information for
user authentication [32]. Huber et al. presented friend-in-
the-middle-attack on Facebook which could leverage social
information about users in an automated fashion [34]. They
further pointed out the possibility of context-aware spam
and social phishing attacks, where attacks were found to be
cheap in terms of cost and hardware. Boshmaf et al. high-
lighted vulnerabilities that can be exploited by social bots
to infiltrate OSNs [23]. They showed that social bots can
mimic real users and exploit friendship network leading to
strong privacy implications. Kurowski showed a manual at-
tack on WhatsApp to retrieve personal information about
victims and proposed the feasibility of social phishing at-
tacks against victims [42].
In this paper, we demonstrate how phone numbers can be
used for automated cross-application targeted attacks where
people are attacked on one application by leveraging infor-
mation from multiple other applications i.e. using True-
caller and Facebook to launch targeted phishing, vishing,
and whaling attacks on OTT messaging applications, voice,
e-mail, or SMS.
3. SYSTEM OVERVIEW: FEASIBILITY AND
AUTOMATION
In this section, we demonstrate the feasibility and the
ease with which different targeted attacks can be crafted
by abusing phone numbers. To automate the whole process,
we build a system that exploits cross-application features to
collect information about a phone’s user and determines the
attack channel (OTT messaging applications, voice, e-mail,
or SMS) and targeted or non-targeted attack vectors (see
Figure 1). Specifically, the system has four main steps. a)
Based on a numbering plan, phone numbers are randomly
generated and inserted into an address book of a smart-
phone. This address book is on a device that is under the
control of the attacker. b) The system fetches data from
Truecaller and Facebook applications to determine any ad-
ditional information about the owners of those phone num-
bers. c) After the information is aggregated, the system
determines the attack channel viz. OTT messaging applica-
tions, voice, e-mail, or SMS, and d) finally crafts an attack
vector and targets the victim with the best possible attack
(based on the information collected).
Figure 1: System for Cross-Application Information
Gathering and Attack Architecture.
3.1 Step 1: Setting Up Attack Device
This section elaborates phone number generation and set-
ting up the device under attacker’s control, once phone num-
bers are generated. The system generates a large pool of
phone numbers which could be exploited by an attacker
to launch targeted attacks. There are several methods to
obtain a pool of phone numbers; consolidating white-pages
directory or any other public online directories, or scrap-
ing the Internet using regex patterns. We chose the easiest
method for an attacker; taking random phone numbers as
initial seeds, incrementing the digits by one to obtain a suf-
ficient pool. Unlike e-mail addresses, the phone number set
is finite, therefore, an entire range can be enumerated and
inserted into the address book. This may give a few misses
as some phone numbers may not be allocated for general
use. Once phone numbers are generated, attacker initializes
the address book of the device under his control. The phone
numbers added in the address book are now his potential
victims for carrying out various kinds of targeted attacks as
demonstrated in this paper.
3.2 Step 2: Collecting Information for an At-
tack Vector
In this step, the system aggregates all the available infor-
mation to launch an attack against the victim. To obtain
information about the victim, we used Truecaller, an appli-
cation that enables searching contact information using a
phone number [12]. Its legitimate use is to identify incom-
ing callers and block unwanted calls. It is a global collab-
orative phone directory that keeps data of more than one
billion people around the globe. We used Truecaller as an
example, but any such application can be used to determine
this information. Truecaller also maintains data from social
networking sites and correlates this information to create a
large dataset for people who register on it. Also, due to its
address book syncing feature, it retrieves information about
contacts (friends) of the “owner of the phone number” who
installed it too. The ‘search’ endpoint of Truecaller applica-
tion provides details of an individual like:
name, address, phone number, country, Twitter
ID, e-mail, Facebook ID, Twitter photo URL, and
photo URL.
However, the private information obtained is according to
the privacy settings of users.
We automated the whole process of fetching information
about phone numbers from Truecaller. We exploited the
search end-point (used to search information about a ran-
dom phone number) to obtain the registration ID corre-
sponding to a particular phone number 1. This was nec-
essary to make authenticated requests and retrieve the in-
formation from their servers. We extracted the registra-
tion ID from the network packet sent while searching a ran-
dom phone number on Truecaller application installed on
our iPhone as shown in Figure 2. Once the registration
ID was obtained, we programmatically fetched information
for phone numbers in our dataset. Multiple instances of
the process were initiated, on a 2.5 GHz Intel i5 processor,
4GB RAM at the rate of 3000 requests / min. We worked
with only one registration ID for not abusing the Truecaller
servers and effecting its services, however, it is easy for an
attacker to scale the process by collecting multiple registra-
tion IDs to bypass rate limits imposed by Truecaller.
Figure 2: Screenshot of a network packet which is
used to obtain the registration ID from Truecaller
to fetch information from its servers.
To obtain the social network of the victim, we used Face-
book, the largest social network of family and friends [1]. We
assume that friends obtained will be related to the person
in some way or the other which can increase the probabil-
ity of success of a social phishing attack. However, we do
not differentiate between the affinity of a friend Alice with
the victim as compared to another friend Charlie. Though,
there may be greater affinity with one friend as compared
to the other in the real-world, however, in this paper, we
treat all friends equal and leave affinity determination as fu-
ture work. Truecaller aggregates data from various social
networking websites and sometimes provides a link to the
public profile picture of the victim on Facebook. We ex-
tracted Facebook ID from these links to retrieve friends of
the victim on Facebook.
Extracting friends from victim’s profile is a non-trivial
task, since everyone does not have their friendlist set as
public. Therefore, we decided to use public sources like vic-
tim’s public feed, victim’s public photo albums, and victim’s
public posts on Facebook to obtain friends information [3],
assuming users liking / commenting on any of these pub-
lic sources are friends of the victim. To validate the above
1We used this phone number only for research purposes and
nothing else.
hypothesis, we performed a small experiment to determine
if friends obtained from public sources on Facebook are a
subset of public friendlist. Even though normal access to-
ken from Facebook does not provide these details, we were
able to fetch the information using a never-expiring mo-
bile OAuth token obtained from iPhone’s Facebook applica-
tion 2. We monitored the data packet sent while launching
Facebook application on our iPhone device and extracted
the authentication token to make further requests.
We collected a random sample of 122,696 Facebook IDs
and obtained 95,756 friends from public sources and 80,979
friends from public friendlist (see Figure 3). There were only
62,574 users for whom we were able to find friends from both
public sources and public friendlist. Out of which, we found
that 42,552 (68%) user-IDs liking and commenting on pub-
lic sources were part of victim’s friendlist with more than
95% matching rate. As observed in Figure 3, in some cases
friends from public sources were not a complete subset of
friends from public friendlist. We obtained 5,881 friends
with 90 - 95% matching, 3,754 friends with 85 - 90% match-
ing, and 10,387 friends with less than 85% matching. This
could be because some users might have disabled all plat-
form applications from accessing their data. In this case,
they might not appear anywhere in any Facebook API [5].
To launch attacks using friends information, friends can be
picked from public friendlist, if available, else, the attacker
can rely on public sources to extract friends. Therefore, we
extracted the Facebook ID from the photo URL (using reg-
ular expression) obtained from Truecaller JSON response,
and obtained public sources using Facebook Graph API to
find friends on Facebook to craft social phishing attack vec-
tor. For example, following JSON object was obtained for
one of the phone numbers in the dataset –
{
"NAME": "XXXXX",
"NUMBER ": "+91 XX0000000X",
"COUNTRY ": "India",
"PHOTO_URL ": "http :// graph.facebook.com/
XXXXXX/picture?width =320& height =320",
"e-mail": " "
}.
The Facebook ID was parsed from PHOTO_URL and used to
make further requests. E-mail addresses for some users were
also available which can be used to target them.
An attacker can utilize the information, as obtained in this
step and craft attack vectors described in step 4. The at-
tacker can craft non-targeted attacks, in case no information
about the victim is obtained.
Apart from applications like Truecaller and Facebook that
we explored in this paper, attackers can exploit CNAM (Caller
ID Name) database 3, a database that is linked to names
of calling number. The service operational in US, provides
information associated with a landline number. Attackers
can use this to obtain basic information about their targets.
This is out of scope of current work.
3.3 Step 3: Formulating Attacker’s Profile and
Attack Channel
2We are not sure if this is an additional feature provided by
Facebook or a bug in their system. At the time of writing
this paper, we did not find any official Facebook documen-
tation about it.
3http://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/CNAM
Figure 3: Relation between friends obtained from
public sources and public friendlist. Friends from
public sources are found to be a subset of friends
from public friendlist in 68% cases (with more than
95% matching).
Once the data is collected about phone number’s owner,
the system determines the channel (OTT messaging appli-
cations, voice, e-mail, or SMS) to phish the victim. This
entirely depends on whether the victim is present on that
particular channel.
OTT messaging applications .
If the attacker decides to choose OTT messaging applica-
tions like WhatsApp, Viber, or Snapchat, he needs to en-
sure if the victim is using one of these applications. This is
achieved by exploiting the address book syncing feature in
OTT messaging applications. Once a user registers himself
on these applications, his contacts in the address book are
uploaded (automatically, for some applications) to the OTT
messaging applications’ service provider and are matched
against the users of the application to find already exist-
ing contacts. Only the information about the owners of
the phone numbers present in the address book is retrieved.
Unlike Facebook and Twitter, these applications make no
suggestions / recommendations for people who might be us-
ing these OTT messaging applications. While this makes it
easy and convenient for users to discover friends on these
applications rather than adding them manually, it poses a
security threat as well as, an attacker can use this to find
the presence or absence of the victim on these applications
(i.e., the attack channel). The attacker can himself create a
convincing profile (profile picture and local phone number)
on WhatsApp to make sure the victim feels that attacker is
legitimate.
Voice.
In addition, an attacker can choose voice as an attack
channel to target their victims. Similar to OTT messaging
applications, to target victims on this channel, an attacker
needs to gather relevant information without checking the
presence of the victim beforehand. An attacker can device
a strategy to make himself look like a trusted or legitimate
organization, to gain victim’s trust. Specifically, attackers
can exploit the integrity of information provided by caller
ID applications like Truecaller [12], Facebook’s Hello [4],
and Whitepages Caller ID and Block [17]. These applica-
tions are emerging to help in getting additional information
about the incoming caller. In general, these applications al-
low an individual to register using his / her phone number
and help in identifying the caller by showing the informa-
tion (like name) from their respective databases. Caller ID
applications also gather information from social networking
sites to collect more information about the caller. Attack-
ers can undermine such an application to gain trust of their
victims. Specifically, a) attackers can register a phone num-
ber (controlled by him / her) as a trusted bank / company
/ organization in which a user is interested in or is dealing
with; b) spoof one of the already registered phone numbers
with the caller ID applications and call victims such that the
call appears to come from a real entity. We describe each of
them in detail.
• Fake Registration: An attacker can add spurious
information in caller ID applications fairly easily, thus
compromising the integrity of the information provided
by them to gain victim’s trust. Associating an iden-
tity with a phone number increases the trust of an
individual and likelihood to pick a call. Since caller
ID applications do not have a mechanism for verifica-
tion of the users’ details, and rely on the information
provided by the user while registering, it is easy for an
attacker to abuse this trust. For example, an attacker
can register as multiple fake banks on caller ID appli-
cations as shown in Figure 4. We only use HDFC Bank
as an example, but any name / entity can be used.
Figure 4: Fake registration on Truecaller as HDFC.
For registration, he needs a smartphone device with
working phone connection. It is a manual process
where a short SMS code is sent from caller ID ap-
plications to verify the phone number. Since the num-
ber of banks are limited, it is not difficult for the at-
tacker to do this manually. Attacker does not know
the bank of all these victims, therefore, the attacker
can target a large user population to achieve a good
success rate. As millions of automated VoIP calls can
be generated at low cost, as shown in the past, at-
tacker does not need to worry about picking only the
victims whose banks are known [30]. To make the pro-
file look more authentic, fake social media profiles can
be created and linked to caller ID applications while
registering an account on it. Top five most popular ap-
plications (Truecaller, Whitepages caller ID and Block,
Facebook’s Hello, Whoscall-Caller ID and Block, and
Contactive) with fake registrations as HDFC bank by
exploiting caller ID applications has been shown in Ap-
pendix.
• Caller ID spoofing: Another trick to deceive vic-
tims uses caller ID spoofing which can be carried out
by imitating already registered phone numbers or other
phone numbers whose details were uploaded by caller
ID applications exploiting address book syncing fea-
ture. As a user must have entered some details about
him / her while registering, it makes the attacker look
genuine, than an unknown phone number flashing on
the screen.
SMS.
An attacker can choose SMS as the attack channel to phish
their victims. He needs to gather relevant information about
the victim without checking his / her presence on the attack
channel. As the victim does not see any profile of the at-
tacker, he can choose using a local phone number to gain
victim’s confidence.
E-mail.
Since so many people around the world depend on e-mail,
it is a lucrative channel for attacks. Attackers lure people in
giving away their information or entice them to take some
action. If there is a non-empty field in the JSON object
received from the Truecaller, e-mail can be used to phish
users. Attackers can craft these e-mails to look convincing,
sending them out to literally millions of people around the
world [8]. As attacker’s profile is visible to the victim, he
can carefully choose an e-mail address and name to convince
victim about his authenticity.
3.4 Step 4: Crafting Attack Vector
After the attack channel is determined, attacker can craft
appropriate attack vector to phish the victim. We describe
the attack vector generation details for each of the attacks
below.
3.4.1 Social Phishing Attacks
Although phishing is a social engineering attack, here we
discuss social phishing [35], i.e., how phishing attacks can be
better targeted by making them appear to be coming from
a friend within victim’s own network. Friends’ information
can be conveniently chosen to gain trust, therefore, the at-
tacker uses victim’s name and one of his friend’s information
(i.e., friend’s name) to craft the attack vector. This infor-
mation is obtained from Facebook, as discussed earlier in
this section.
3.4.2 Whaling attacks
Whaling attacks [15] that are directed specifically at senior
executives or other high-profile individuals within a busi-
ness, government, or other organization. It uses the same
technique as above mentioned targeted phishing, vishing, or
whaling attacks but the intended victims are people with
high influence or high-net-worth individuals. In India, there
is a particular set of phone numbers reserved by mobile op-
erators for politicians, bureaucrats, and people willing to
invest large amount of money to get these special phone
numbers. They are called Vanity / VIP / Fancy numbers
and follow a specific pattern [13]. It could be one digit re-
peated several times, 99999-xxxxx or xx-8888-xxxx; two
digits, xx-85-85-85-xx; or in different orders, xx-123-123-
xx or xx-11-112233. The main advantage of vanity phone
numbers over standard phone numbers is increased memora-
bility. Since they are bought at higher price, owners of these
phone numbers can be assumed as people with high influ-
ence who likely are more attractive targets for attackers [9].
For very special numbers, network providers host auctions
online where people can purchase these numbers [2]. Us-
ing only vanity numbers in the address book, attackers can
launch whaling attacks that only targets HNIs (High-net-
worth individuals) by sending them targeted or non-targeted
phishing messages or initiating vishing calls.
3.4.3 Spear Phishing Attacks
Spear phishing attacks are directed at specific individuals
or companies. These attacks are crafted using some a-priori
knowledge of either victim’s name, location, or interests to
make it more believable and increase the likelihood of its
success. We focus on generating spear phishing attack vec-
tors using victim’s name, as obtained from Truecaller.
3.4.4 Non-targeted Attacks
Non-targeted attacks are undirected attacks which are
aimed to target as many users as possible. The goal is to
reach out to a large audience and not to target a particu-
lar individual. Since it only requires the knowledge whether
the victim is present on the channel, this can be achieved
by crafting a non-targeted phishing, vishing, or whaling at-
tack, even if no information about the victim is available.
With low VoIP calls, non-targeted vishing attacks are cost-
effective for attackers.
All the targeted and non-targeted attacks described in this
step can be launched on either channels viz., OTT messaging
applications, voice, e-mail, or SMS.
4. SCALABILITY
To define scalability, we assume that an attacker starts
with no information about its potential targets. The attack
method’s scalability can be characterized by the fraction of
people who can be reached over an attack channel, and tar-
geted attacks can be launched against them. To demonstrate
the scalability of our attacks, we enumerated through a list
of 1,162,696 random Indian phone numbers. Since these
numbers are chosen randomly, no additional information is
available about their owners at the beginniing. We demon-
strate the scale at which each of the proposed attacks can
be carried out with the techniques described earlier.
4.1 Phishing Attacks
We forged the address book of an Android device by in-
serting all these phone numbers in multiple phases. The next
step was to collect attributes associated with the owner of
the phone number (victim). Truecaller (TC) was used to
collect more information about the victims. Detailed infor-
mation for 722,696 (62%) users was collected using True-
caller; name was obtained for all the users as shown in
Figure 5. For rest of the users whose information cannot
be obtained from Truecaller, non-targeted phishing attacks
can be launched against them. To craft more targeted and
personalized attacks, i.e., social phishing attacks, friends in-
formation was leveraged from Facebook (FB). Social circle
information was obtained for 114,161 (93%) out of 122,696
users; 80,979 from public friendlist and 33,182 friends from
public sources. To check the presence of these numbers on
an attack channel, they were synced with WhatsApp ap-
plication (WA) using address book syncing feature. About
51,409 users were present on WA. Social phishing attacks
can be launched against these users whereas spear phishing
attacks can be launched against other 180,000 users whose
social circle was not obtained, but were present on WA.
Numbers which were not found on WhatsApp either may
not be allocated to any user or may not be registered on it.
Spear phishing attacks can be launched against 600,000
users on voice or SMS. In addition, 122,696 users can be
social phished on voice or SMS. E-mail address for 81,389
users were obtained from Truecaller; 13,754 can be social
phished and 67,635 can be spear phished on voice or SMS.
Figure 5: Data collection to demonstrate scalabil-
ity of phishing attacks of the system choosing OTT
messaging applications as the attack channel, WA–
WhatsApp, TC–Truecaller, FB–Facebook.
4.2 Vishing Attacks
Personal information for 722,696 users was found on True-
caller against 1,162,696 phone numbers searched. Vishing
attacks can be crafted against the owners of these phone
numbers. We could extract Facebook ID’s for 122,696 users.
Using Facebook Graph API, we obtained following details
for these users: gender (112,880), relationship status (57,755),
work details (92,352), school information (110,426), employer
details (106,746), birthday (9,728), and hometown (80,979).
The collated information can be used to increase the success
rate of targeted vishing attacks.
4.3 Whaling Attacks
As owners of vanity numbers might belong to elite mem-
bers of the society, they can be of particular interest to at-
tackers. We looped through the “patterns” available from an
e-auction website to enumerate vanity numbers pool [2]. We
initialized our smartphone’s address book with 171,323 van-
ity numbers. We found 91,487 vanity numbers on Truecaller
and 11,286 on Facebook. They were synced with WhatsApp
and 5,756 (51%) were found on it. Out of 11,286 vanity
numbers that were found on Truecaller and Facebook; we
obtained personal information (using Facebook) about own-
ers as follows: gender (10,246), relationship status (3,733),
birthday (726), work details (6,729), school details (10,994),
employer details (9,801), and hometown (6,952). We manu-
ally analyzed Facebook profiles of 100 random vanity num-
ber owners to find their occupation details and found di-
rector / CEO / chairman (10), student (10), engineer (12),
consultants (2), business (5), accountant / officer (8), lec-
turer (5), manager (8), bank officials (12) for 70 user pro-
files.
Whaling attacks with social information was obtained for
11,286 users which can be attacked on voice or SMS. How-
ever, only name was obtained for 80,201 users, using True-
caller, who can be made targets on voice or SMS. E-mail
address for 11,013 users was obtained; 1,354 users with so-
cial information. Attacks can be made more targeted and
personalized against these users.
5. ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Crawling data is an ethically sensitive area. We did the
data collection just to demonstrate the feasibility and scal-
ability of targeted attacks by abusing a phone number. The
goal of this work was not to collect personal information
about individuals, but to explore how such applications can
be abused to collect personal information. As a proof of
concept, we collected information about owners of random
phone numbers ensuring that the collected information is
not made available to any other organization or individual.
All the conducted experiments were approved by the Insti-
tutional Review Board (IRB) of our institution. Data col-
lected from the participants was anonymized and protected
according to the procedures described in the corresponding
IRB submission documents. At the end of our experiments
and analysis, phone numbers of all the profiles were delinked
to maintain privacy and confidentiality of data. Phone num-
bers and Facebook IDs were hashed to preserve privacy. We
collected only the public information available on Facebook
using it’s Graph API.
6. STUDY DESIGN
In this paper, we only focus on demonstrating the effec-
tiveness of phishing attacks on OTT messaging applications.
Thus, we do not address effectiveness of the other attacks
and channels as demonstrated in previous sections.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of phishing attacks on
OTT messaging applications, we chose to conduct an online
roleplay user study on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
We chose this over a real-world study because conducting
a real-world study would involve user deception. To launch
attacks as proposed in this paper would require us to gather
personally identifiable information (phone number) that would
not be possible without deception. Deception studies chal-
lenge the principle of respect for person, and are generally
not preferred in the research community due to unforesee-
able consequences [28, 36]. Debriefing, unless carried out
face-to-face between researcher and the subject, remains a
challenge as it is almost impossible to replicate it in online
phishing studies. A study that launched actual phishing at-
tacks without informing their users reported that users got
infuriated with the attacks after they were debriefed [35].
Owing to these constraints and limitations, we chose to val-
idate the effectiveness of our attacks using a roleplay user
study. The benefit of the roleplay is that it enables re-
searchers to study effect of phishing attacks without con-
ducting an actual phishing attack. It has been shown that
such roleplay tasks have good internal and external valid-
ity [29, 41, 47]. The study was built using Javascript frame-
work and not based on standard self-reporting data collec-
tion techniques like survey and questionnaires.
Participation was restricted to those who were above 18
years of age and had been using WhatsApp on regular ba-
sis. There was no restriction on the participants belong-
ing to a particular region or country. All participants who
completed the experiment were paid $0.30. Our experiment
consists of two phases, a) Briefing: to ensure that partici-
pants have concrete information and clear role description.
b) The Play: to assess participants susceptibility to phish-
ing attacks. Participants were exposed to one of the three
phishing attack vectors: non-targeted (e1), spear (e2), and
social (e3).
6.1 Briefing
Susceptibility to phishing attacks was measured with re-
sponse to a roleplay task which was built on Javascript and
showed multiple screens as WhatsApp screenshots. This
phase of the study was common across all participants to
familiarize them with the real-world scenario. A hypotheti-
cal situation for the participant to assume himself as“Dave”,
and has friends “Alice”, “Bob” and “Charlie”. We used Face-
book as a medium to bootstrap this and to let the partici-
pant familiarize with the roles. An attacker can extract this
information from Facebook and create a social phishing at-
tack vector to phish the victim, which is modeled in this step.
Next screen shows the registration on WhatsApp, as“Dave”,
using a random phone number. The aim is to make the par-
ticipant understand that the user (i.e., Dave) has an account
on WhatsApp. Once registered, WhatsApp syncs Dave’s
address book and found only Charlie. Note that other Face-
book friends of Dave (i.e., Alice and Bob) were not present
on WhatsApp. There could be two reasons, either Dave does
not have Alice’s and Bob’s number in his smartphone or Al-
ice and Bob do not have an account on WhatsApp. The
primary idea is to introduce Charlie as the only friend who
is present on WhatsApp and other friends (Alice and Bob)
are not present on WhatsApp. This is to mimic the attack
model when an attacker might not know which of victim’s
friend is present on WhatsApp. Therefore, the success of the
attack should be independent of this knowledge; who pro-
vided wrong answers to any of the following two questions
asked, “Who was your friend on Facebook?”, and “Who was
your friend on WhatsApp?”. Since correct answers to these
questions were provided during course of the experiment,
participants who did not provide correct answers were fil-
tered out.
6.2 The Play
In this phase of the user study, participants were exposed
to one of the three cases of phishing: non-targeted, spear,
and social. Each of the case was randomly assigned to the
participants. In all three cases, the legitimate case was
shown to the participant to ensure that his responses were
as expected as in a real-world scenario i.e., given a message
m and a trust function T ,
T (m) from known no. ≥ T (m) from an unknown no. (1)
The order of phishing and legitimate messages was ran-
domized to avoid learning bias during the course of the ex-
periment. Some participants were removed from the analysis
due to unexpected behavior as discussed in Section 6.3. At
the end of each WhatsApp message shown to the partici-
pant, the participant was asked the following question and
corresponding options: “What would you like to do with the
message?” with following options: click, reply, delete, or do
nothing. Now we describe the three experiments to test the
success of phishing attacks. Since the names and message
content were kept same in all the three experiments, we do
not foresee any bias.
e1: Testing non-targeted phishing attack’s success.
Non-targeted phishing is defined as an attack scenario
where no additional information about the victim is known
beforehand, except the phone number. In the play phase,
participants were exposed to two scenarios in a random or-
der to avoid learning bias; probably phishing message (G#1)
and legitimate message (#1) . In G#1, the sender is a random
phone number, whereas, in #1, the message is from Dave’s
friend Charlie. The former scenario is probable phishing be-
cause from Dave’s perspective, the sender could be one of
his friends who is not present in his WhatsApp contacts.
However, the latter case is legitimate because Charlie was
already in Dave’s address book, as mentioned during the
briefing phase (see Section 6.1).
e2: Testing spear phishing attack’s success.
Spear phishing is defined as an attack where some infor-
mation about the victim is known beforehand, in addition
to his phone number. In our experiment, name of the par-
ticipant was “Dave”, as described in the briefing phase. This
information was used to craft a spear phishing attack vector.
Similar to non-targeted phishing, participants were exposed
to two scenarios; probably phishing message (G#2) and legit-
imate message (#2). In G#2, the sender is a random phone
number, whereas in #2, the message appears to be coming
from the friend Charlie. However, with one notable differ-
ence, that the name of the victim (Dave) was added to the
message to make it more personalized as compared to e1.
e3: Testing social phishing attack’s success.
Social phishing is defined as an attack where social infor-
mation (friends, acquaintances, colleagues, etc.) associated
with the victim is gathered, in addition to known basic infor-
mation about the victim (name and phone number). In this
part of the experiment, participants were exposed to three
scenarios (as compared to two in e1 and e2) in a random
order; probably phishing message (G#3), legitimate message
(#3), and phishing message ( 3). In G#3, the sender is a
random phone number, however, mentioning the name of
“Alice” (one of Dave’s friend on Facebook but not in the
WhatsApp contacts, see Section 6.1). From Dave’s perspec-
tive, this could probably be a legitimate message because
Alice is not in Dave’s address book and plausibly in real-
world scenario Alice is trying to initiate a conversation with
Dave. On the other hand, this could be a phishing mes-
sage, because friend’s name (Alice) could be forged and an
attacker could imitate Alice and send a message to Dave. In#3, the message appears to be coming from the friend Char-
lie and in  3, the message is coming from a random phone
number having Charlie as the friend’s name. Since, Charlie
is anyways a friend of Dave on WhatsApp, this is definitely
a phishing attack because the sender phone number should
have shown Charlie and not a random number.
6.3 Effectiveness of Attacks
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of phish-
ing attacks performed during our user study. In total, 460
participants completed the entire user study, out of which
129 participants were filtered out based on answers to two
questions asked from the participants during the briefing
phase (see Section 6.1). We present the results based on re-
maining 331 participants. We used Kruskal Wallis and Mann
Whitney statistical tests to check the behavior of population
subject to different order of messages shown to them. We
did not find statistical difference between the random groups
in falling victims to all three kinds of phishing attacks.
Table 1 summarizes the results obtained in three exper-
iment scenarios e1, e2 and e3 as mentioned in Section 6.2.
In this work, we define the success of a phishing attack if
either a participant decided to click the link or reply to the
message, whereas, attack is unsuccessful if the participant
decided to delete or do nothing about the message. Note
that these are potential victims who may fall for phishing at-
tacks. Actual phishing attack happens when the participant
goes through all the steps in the phishing attack i.e. by pro-
viding his / her personal details like credit card information,
passwords etc. on the phishing web page. However, previ-
ous studies have established that a very high percentage of
participants who click on the link continue to provide infor-
mation to the phishing websites [40, 41, 47]. We believe that
users who choose to reply to the message are potential vic-
tims too, as the attacker can verify active usage of the phone
number. Also, attacker can lure the victim to give out per-
sonal information in subsequent messages. Extra cautious
users would have preferred to either delete / do nothing with
the message received. We denote,
upriseG#, uprise#, uprise =⇒ clicked / replied to the message, andG#,#, =⇒ deleted / did nothing about the message
For example,
upriseG# means participant chose to click or reply
to a probably phishing message, while G# means participant
chose to delete or do nothing about the probably phishing
message. We remove those participants from our further
analysis who chose to click on phishing / vulnerable message
but not on the legitimate message. Because according to
equation 1, T (#) ≥ T ( ) and T (#) ≥ T (G#). We denote
these participants as Unknown (see Table 1).
Table 1: Possible outcomes of phishing attacks for
each experiment. (G# → probably phishing message,
# → legitimate message,  → phishing message, uprise#
→ click / reply to a legitimate message, # → delete
/ do nothing to a legitimate message).
Case Vulnerable Cautious Unknown
e1
upriseG# uprise# (37) G# uprise# (24) upriseG# # (7)
G# # (46)
e2
upriseG# uprise# (56) G# uprise# (19) upriseG# # (4)
G# # (28)
e3
upriseG# uprise# uprise (54) G# uprise#  (12) upriseG# #  (2)
upriseG# uprise#  (9) G# #  (20) G# # uprise (1)
G# uprise# uprise (9) upriseG# # uprise (3)
We denote those participants who chose to click / reply
(a) G#1 (b) #1 (c) G#2 (d) G#3
Figure 6: Three phishing attack scenarios shown to the participants (here, we only show the trimmed version
of the actual screenshots). The top left-hand corner shows the sender’s phone number (or name in case the
sender’s phone number is in WhatsApp contacts).
on either phishing ( ) or probably phishing messages (G#)
or both as Vulnerable (i.e. falling for phishing attacks). All
other participants were part of Cautious group, i.e., who
chose to delete or do nothing about both phishing ( ) and
probably phishing messages (G#).
We define the success rate of phishing attack as:
Success(%) =
V ulnerable
V ulnerable + Cautious
∗ 100
In total, we have 314 out of 331 participants who were
either vulnerable or cautious. We rest our analysis on these
314 participants. We found that phishing attacks on OTT
messaging applications were successful as, e1 = 34.5% (37
out 107), e2 = 54.3% (56 out of 103), and e3 = 69.2% (72
out of 104). This is consistent with prior work that social
phishing is the most effective out of the three. Furthermore,
in social phishing as observed from Table 1, equal number
of participants (63 = 54+9) fell for phishing when the name
mentioned in the message text was Charlie (i.e., it is com-
ing from a friend who is in Dave’s WhatsApp contacts) and
when the name was Alice (i.e., it is coming from a friend who
is not in Dave’s WhatsApp contacts). This shows that in-
cluding friend’s name in the message (irrespective of whether
the friend is present or absent on WhatsApp) increases the
success rate of phishing attacks. We repeated the analy-
sis for random 25%, 50%, and 75% of the total participant
population and found the success results to be consistent.
Hence, we can establish that the participant pool size is suf-
ficient for our analysis.
6.4 Limitations
There are a few limitations to the current study. First, the
sample was drawn from MTurk users and is not expected to
be a complete representative of people using OTT messag-
ing applications. Our sample of MTurk users tend to be
younger, more educated, and more tech-savvy than the gen-
eral public. A second limitation of this study is the lack of
direct consequences for user behavior. Participants might be
more willing to engage in risky behavior in this roleplay if
they feel immune to any negative outcomes that may follow.
However, the factors used to determine phishing susceptibil-
ity would not differ as observed in the real-world behavior.
7. MITIGATING RISKS
Based on the exploits we found as described in Section 3.4,
we present recommendations on how to alleviate (if not elim-
inate) the security risks created by these exploits. We com-
municated with a number of service providers highlighting
the security issues; they considered it to be a serious problem
and ensured prompt redressal. To combat the abuse, there
have been services in place, for instance, CNAM lookup
databases 4 for landlines numbers. Also, initiatives like Se-
cure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) working group 5
aim to provide a more secure telephony identity by limiting
the ability to spoof phone Caller ID. However, this relied on
PKI that is currently not implemented. Recently, some ser-
vices have put some defensive measures in place. WhatsApp
incorporated spam blocker feature as a first step in this di-
rection [16], though their effectiveness need to be studied.
Facebook patched the mobile OAuth token which enabled us
to obtain personal public information, which was otherwise
unavailable via Graph API.
7.1 OTT Messaging Applications
Given the plausibility of phishing attacks on OTT messag-
ing applications, this medium needs to be better defended.
OTT messaging applications can put certain checks; restrict
address book sync features, where people can be added only
based on requests (like Facebook). End-to-end encryption
poses a major challenge to identify a phishing message at
zero hour. In order to effectively defend against phish-
ing message, one solution could be assigning crowd-sourced
score (phishing) to the source of a phishing message. OTT
messaging applications can filter messages with high phish-
ing score. However, introducing noise in the dataset, re-
mains a challenge. To this end, we are currently investi-
gating a defense from our side. It involves building cross
platform intelligence from existing Internet infrastructure
to associate history with a given phone number which can
hep in modeling potentially bad phone numbers.
7.2 Caller ID Applications
There is also a necessity to ensure the integrity of the
information provided by caller ID applications, as people
rely heavily on them to know about the incoming call and
trust the information provided by these services.
Verification.
One of the biggest challenge that caller ID applications
have to face is to implement verification of the information
4http://www.voip-info.org/wiki/view/CNAM
5https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/stir/charter/
provided by users. Currently, at the time of registration,
only phone numbers are verified, and neither the entity be-
hind these phone numbers nor the details of owners of these
phone numbers is verified. Caller ID applications can check
the integrity of specific business organizations with appro-
priate authority, listing them as verified users, and routinely
scan for any malicious activity in these accounts. Similar
techniques can be implemented by caller ID applications
to maintain the integrity of the information stored in their
databases.
Additional Information About Callers.
Additional information can be provided about the caller /
the owner of the phone number. For instance, applications
can record the timestamp when the account was registered
and call frequency patterns. These details can be provided
to the user so that he / she can make an informed deci-
sion about the caller. In addition, social information about
the caller can be displayed, like number of mutual friends,
presence on social networks etc. Caller ID applications can
design several metrics like social rank based on the informa-
tion aggregated across social networks. If the same name
appears across multiple networks and the user is found to
be active, he / she can be assigned a higher score than a
passive user.
Delinking information.
Caller ID applications like Truecaller serve as a reservoir of
information, by collating information from multiple sources.
The data from different sources should not be aggregated
and stored at the same place, it serves as a goldmine reser-
voir. Some parts of the information can be even encrypted
to ensure unnecessary information leakage.
8. CONCLUSION
OTT messaging and Voice over IP applications are gain-
ing popularity worldwide. These applications have millions
of registered users. As much as these applications attract
users, spammers find them attractive as well. In this paper,
we demonstrated the feasibility, automation, scalability of
targeted phishing, vishing, and whaling attacks by abusing
phone numbers. We investigated how easy it would be for
a potential attacker to launch automated targeted and non-
targeted attacks on different channels viz., OTT messaging
applications, voice, e-mail, or SMS. We presented a novel,
scalable system which takes a phone number as an input,
leverages information from Truecaller (to obtain vicitm’s
details) and Facebook (to obtain social circle), checks for
the presence of phone number’s owner on the attack chan-
nel (OTT messaging applications, voice, e-mail, or SMS),
and finally targets the victim. We collected information
for 1,162,696 Indian phone numbers and show how non-
targeted and targeted phishing, vishing, and whaling attacks
can be crafted against the owners of these phone numbers
by exploiting cross-application features. Social and spear
phishing attacks can be launched against 51,409 and 180,000
users respectively. Vishing attacks can be launched against
722,696 users. We also found 91,487 highly influential vic-
tims who can be attacked by crafting whaling attacks. To
evaluate the effectiveness of one of our attacks, phishing
attacks, we conducted an online roleplay study with 314
participants on Amazon MTurk. Our results show that so-
cial phishing (69.2%) is the most successful phishing attack
on OTT messaging applications, followed by spear (54.3%),
and non-targeted phishing (35.5%). To mitigate the attacks
demonstrated in this paper, we also suggest some recom-
mendations for OTT messaging applications and caller ID
applications which can prevent their users falling prey to
targeted attacks.
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10. APPENDIX
(a) Truecaller (b) Whitepages Caller
ID & Block
(c) Facebook’s Hello (d) Whoscall-Caller ID
and Block
(e) Contactive
Figure 7: Incoming call showing fake HDFC bank (example in our case) on various caller ID applications.
